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ABSTRACT 
 
 
VIETNAM’S TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND ACCESSION TO THE WTO 
 
By 
 
Vu Van Hoa 
 
 
The doi moi (renovation policy) that Vietnam adopted in the late 1980s has led to 
high growth and more openness in the economy. However, for fur ther sustainable 
development of the country, Vietnam should accelerate the pace of integration into the 
world economy, and becoming the member of WTO is an important step for Vietnam in 
this integration process. 
The purpose of this thesis is aimed at (i) understanding the WTO principles and 
agreements and based on that to draw implications for Vietnam’s trade liberalization; (ii) 
finding the answer for the question why the accession process is so time-consuming, what 
accession procedures are required, especially for a country in transition like Vietnam; and 
(iii) Reviewing what Vietnam has achieved in trade liberalization process and what are 
the challenges/problems remained to be solved with a view to become a WTO member; 
and (iv) Proposing relevant conclusions and recommendations for Vietnam’s further trade 
liberalization and WTO accession. 
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PART I. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. The Background and Purpose of the Thesis  
While Asia’s financial crisis has left many questioning the wisdom of 
unrestrained capital flows and liberalization of domestic financial markets without 
adequate prudential regulation, the case of free trade and openness remains intact. In a 
global trading environment, minimizing protection of its domestic market will maximize 
the prosperity of any single country and opportunities available to its people. There are 
many experiences showing that countries open to trade grow faster, and that lowering 
trade barriers delivers economic growth as inefficiencies and distortions are eliminated. 
In the literature, overwhelming academic research has shown that more open trade 
leads to a higher rate of growth also in the long run, and that countries with a higher level 
of trade distortions have lower productivity growth than those with fewer trade 
distortions. So more openness and freer trade is clearly good for productivity growth and 
for strengthened competitiveness. 
The doi moi (renovation policy) that Vietnam adopted in the late 1980s has led to 
high growth and more openness in the economy. However, for further sustainable 
development of the country, Vietnam should accelerate the pace of integration into the 
world economy, and becoming the member of WTO is an important step for Vietnam in 
this integration process. 
The purpose of this thesis is aimed at (i) understanding the WTO principles and 
agreements and based on that to draw implications for Vietnam’s trade liberalization; (ii) 
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finding the answer for the question why the accession process is so time-consuming, what 
accession procedures are required, especially for a country in transition like Vietnam; and 
(iii) Reviewing what Vietnam has achieved in trade liberalization process and what are 
the challenges/problems remained to be solved with a view to become a WTO member; 
and (iv) Proposing relevant conclusions and recommendations for Vietnam’s further trade 
liberalization and WTO accession. 
 
1.2. Organization of Thesis 
 The Part II provides an overview of the WTO. This part is divided into 3 major 
subsections. In first subsection, basic knowledge such as history and evolution, purposes 
and functions, principles and agreements, as well as the organization of the WTO are 
provided. The second subsection discusses procedures of WTO accession. Here general 
procedure, including relevant WTO provisions dealing with accession and detail 
accession process guidelines are provided and discussed.   Also in this subsection, 
procedure and status for countries in transition, experiences of other transitional countries 
in acceding to the WTO are discussed with a view to draw relevant experience lessons for 
Vietnam. The third subsection of Part II provides general implications for Vietnam in 
light of the WTO principles and agreements. 
 Part III of the current thesis is about trade liberalization process in Vietnam. In 
this part, the main issues such as the role and importance of trade liberalization in 
Vietnam’s development strategy; Changes in trade policy since Doi moi (Renovation 
Policy); Trade performance in recent years; Vietnam current integration program 
(multilateral arrangements: AFTA, APEC and bilateral: with EU and US) and its relevant 
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to the WTO principles are discussed. Part III also points out challenges/problems that 
have to be solved in Vietnam trade liberalization process. 
Finally, the thesis is completed with Part IV on conclusions and recommendations. 
It summarizes what have been done and what should be done with a view to accelerate 
trade liberalization as well as to become a WTO member for Vietnam. Based on the 
WTO principles/agreements and requirements, concrete actions for Vietnam’s accession 
are also recommended. 
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PART II. OVERVIEW OF THE WTO 
 
 
 
2.1. The WTO in Brief1 
 
2.1.1. History and Evolution of the WTO 
WTO (World Trade Organization) is one of the youngest of the international 
organizations, it was established as a successor to the GATT (General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade) in 1995. So while the WTO is still young, the multilateral trading 
system that was originally set up under GATT is already 50 years old.  
WTO is the only international body dealing with the principles of trade between 
nations. At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the 
world’s trading nations. These documents provide the legal ground-principles for 
international commerce. They are essentially contracts, binding governments to keep 
their trade policies within agreed limits. Although negotiated and signed by governments, 
the goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers conduct their 
business.  
The system was developed through a series of trade negotiations, or rounds, held 
under GATT. The first rounds dealt mainly with tariff reductions but later negotiations 
included other areas such as anti-dumping and non-tariff measures. The latest round —  
the 1986–94 Uruguay Round — led to the WTO’s creation. 
                                               
1 This part is mainly based on official documents of WTO such as WTO (a), WTO(e), WTO (f), WTO(g), 
WTO(i) and Ahn (2000). 
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The negotiations did not end there. Some continued after the end of the Uruguay 
Round. In February 1997 agreement was reached on telecommunications services, with 
69 governments agreeing to wide-ranging liberalization measures that went beyond those 
agreed in the Uruguay Round. 
In the same year 40 governments successfully concluded negotiations for tariff-
free trade in information technology products, and 70 members concluded a financial 
services deal covering more than 95% of trade in banking, insurance, securities and 
financial information. 
At the May 1998 ministerial meeting in Geneva, WTO members agreed to study 
trade issues arising from global electronic commerce. 
The 1999 ministerial conference held in Seattle, United States was unsuccessful. 
The failure of this conference was mainly due to the lack of transparency in the decision-
making mechanism leading to the fact that many developing countries could not 
participate in important negotiations; due to the strict requirements by the United States 
on environmental and labor standards; and no commitments on liberalization of 
agriculture by EU (European Union) and Japan. 
2.1.2. Main Purposes of the WTO 
The system’s overriding purpose is to help trade flow as freely as possible —  so 
long as there are no undesirable side effects. That partly means removing obstacles. It 
also means ensuring that individuals, companies and governments know what the trade 
principles are around the world, and giving them the confidence that there will be no 
sudden changes of policy. In other words, the principles have to be “transparent” and 
predictable.  
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Because the agreements are drafted and signed by the community of trading 
nations, often after considerable debate and controversy, one of the WTO’s most 
important functions is to serve as a forum for trade negotiations.  
A third important side to the WTO’s work is dispute settlement. Trade relations 
often involve conflicting interests. Contracts and agreements, including those 
painstakingly negotiated in the WTO system, often need interpreting. The most 
harmonious way to settle these differences is through some neutral procedure based on an 
agreed legal foundation. That is the purpose behind the dispute settlement process written 
into the WTO agreements.  
2.1.3. The WTO Principles and Agreements 
2.1.3.1 Principles of the Trading System 
The WTO agreements are lengthy and complex because they are legal texts 
covering a wide range of activities. They deal with: agriculture, textiles and clothing, 
banking, telecommunications, government purchases, industrial standards, food 
sanitation regulations, intellectual property, and much more. But a number of simple, 
fundamental principles run throughout all of these documents. These principles are the 
foundation of the multilateral trading system, they can be summarized as follows: 
a) Trade without discrimination 
 
Most-favoured-nation (MFN): treating other people equally Under the WTO 
Agreements, countries cannot normally discriminate between their trading partners. Grant 
someone a special favour (such as a lower customs duty rate for one of their products) 
and you have to do the same for all other WTO members.  
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This principle is known as most- favoured-nation (MFN) treatment.  It is so 
important that it is the first article of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), which governs trade in goods. MFN is also a priority in the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS) (Article 2) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (Article 4), although in each agreement the principle 
is handled slightly differently. Together, those three agreements cover all three main 
areas of trade handled by the WTO. 
Some exceptions are allowed. For example, countries within a region can set up a 
free trade agreement that does not apply to goods from outside the group. Or a country 
can raise barriers against products from specific countries that are considered to be traded 
unfairly. And in services, countries are allowed, in limited circumstances, to discriminate. 
But the agreements only permit these exceptions under strict conditions. In general, MFN 
means that every time a country lowers a trade barrier or opens up a market, it has to do 
so for the same goods or services from all its trading partners —  whether rich or poor, 
weak or strong. 
b) National treatment: Treating foreigners and locals equally Imported and 
locally produced goods should be treated equally —  at least after the foreign goods have 
entered the market. The same should apply to foreign and domestic services, and to 
foreign and local trademarks, copyrights and patents. This principle of “national 
treatment” (giving others the same treatment as one’s own nationals) is also found in all 
the three main WTO agreements (Article 3 of GATT, Article 17 of GATS and Article 3 
of TRIPS), although once again the principle is handled slightly differently in each of 
these. National treatment only applies once a product, service or item of intellectual 
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property has entered the market. Therefore, charging customs duty on an import is not a 
violation of national treatment even if locally-produced products are not charged an 
equivalent tax.  
c) Freer trade: gradually, through negotiation 
Lowering trade barriers is one of the most obvious means of encouraging trade. 
The barriers concerned include customs duties (or tariffs) and measures such as import 
bans or quotas that restrict quantities selectively. From time to time other issues such as 
red tape and exchange rate policies have also been discussed. Since GATT’s creation in 
1947-48 there have been eight rounds of trade negotiations. At first these focused on 
lowering tariffs (customs duties) on imported goods. As a result of the negotiations, by 
the late 1980s industrial countries’ tariff rates on industrial goods had fallen steadily to 
about 6.3%. But by the 1980s, the negotiations had expanded to cover non-tariff barriers 
on goods, and to the new areas such as services and intellectual property. Opening 
markets can be beneficial, but it also requires adjustment. The WTO agreements allow 
countries to introduce changes gradually, through “progressive liberalization”. 
Developing countries are usually given longer to fulfill their obligations.  
d) Predictability: through binding 
Sometimes, promising not to raise a trade barrier can be as important as lowering 
one, because the promise gives businesses a clearer view of their future opportunities. 
With stability and predictability, investment is encouraged, jobs are created and 
consumers can fully enjoy the benefits of competition —  choice and lower prices. The 
multilateral trading system is an attempt by governments to make the business 
environment stable and predictable.  
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In the WTO, when countries agree to open their markets for goods or services, 
they “bind” their commitments. For goods, these bindings amount to ceilings on customs 
tariff rates. Sometimes countries tax imports at rates that are lower than the bound rates. 
Frequently this is the case in developing countries. In developed countries the rates 
actually charged and the bound rates tend to be the same.  
A country can change its bindings, but only after negotiating with its trading 
partners, which could mean compensating them for loss of trade. One of the 
achievements of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade talks was to increase the 
amount of trade under binding commitments. In agriculture, 100% of products now have 
bound tariffs. The result of all this: a substantially higher degree of market security for 
traders and investors. 
The system tries to improve predictability and stability in other ways as well. One 
way is to discourage the use of quotas and other measures used to set limits on quantities 
of imports —  administering quotas can lead to more red-tape and accusations of unfair 
play. Another is to make countries’ trade principles as clear and public (“transparent”) as 
possible. Many WTO agreements require governments to disclose their policies and 
practices publicly within the country or by notifying the WTO. The regular surveillance 
of national trade policies through the Trade Policy Review Mechanism provides a further 
means of encouraging transparency both domestically and at the multilateral level. 
e) Promoting fair competition 
The WTO is sometimes described as a “free trade” institution, but that is not 
entirely accurate. The system does allow tariffs and, in limited circumstances, other 
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forms of protection. More accurately, it is a system of principles dedicated to open, fair 
and undistorted competition. 
The principles on non-discrimination — MFN and national treatment — are 
designed to secure fair conditions of trade. So too are those on dumping (exporting at 
below cost to gain market share) and subsidies. The issues are complex, and the 
principles try to establish what is fair or unfair, and how governments can respond, in 
particular by charging additional import duties calculated to compensate for damage 
caused by unfair trade.  
Many of the other WTO agreements aim to support fair competition: in 
agriculture, intellectual property, services, for example. The agreement on government 
procurement (a “plurilateral” agreement because it is signed by only a few WTO 
members) extends competition principles to purchases by thousands of “government” 
entities in many countries. And so on.  
f) Encouraging development and economic reform 
It is widely recognized by economists and trade experts that the WTO system 
contributes to development. It is also recognized that the least -developed countries need 
flexibility in the time they take to implement the agreements. And the agreements 
themselves inherit the earlier provisions of GATT that allow for special assistance and 
trade concessions for developing countries.  
Over three quarters of WTO members are developing countries and countries in 
transition to market economies. During the seven and a half years of the Uruguay Round, 
over 60 of these countries implemented trade liberalization programs autonomously. At 
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the same time, developing countries and transition economies were much more active and 
influential in the Uruguay Round negotiations than in any previous round.  
 At the end of the Uruguay Round, developing countries were prepared to take on 
most of the obligations that are required of developed countries. But the agreements did 
give them transition per iods to adjust to the more unfamiliar and, perhaps, difficult WTO 
provisions —  particularly so for the poorest, “least-developed” countries. A ministerial 
decision adopted at the end of the round gives least developed countries extra flexibility 
in implementing WTO agreements. It says better-off countries should accelerate 
implementing market access commitments on goods exported by the least-developed 
countries, and it seeks increased technical assistance for them. 
2.1.3.2. The WTO Agreements 
Chart 1: The Basic Structure of the WTO Agreements 
 Goods  Services  Intellectual 
Property 
 Disputes 
Basic 
Principles 
GATT  GATS  TRIPS  Dispute 
Settlement 
Additional 
Details 
Other Goods 
Agreements 
and Annexes 
 Services Annexes     
Market 
Access 
Commitments
Countries’ 
Schedules of 
commitments 
 Countries’ 
Schedules of 
commitments 
(and MNA 
exemptions) 
    
Source: WTO (a), Introducing the WTO. 
a) Three-part broad outline  
 
The agreements for the two largest areas of trade — goods and services —  share a 
common three-part outline, even though the detail is sometimes quite different. 
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· They start with broad principles: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) (for goods), and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
(The agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
also falls into this category although at present it has no additional parts.) 
·  Then come extra agreements and annexes dealing with the special requirements 
of specific sectors or issues. 
· Finally, there are the detailed and lengthy schedules (or lists) of commitments 
made by individual countries allowing specific foreign products or service-
providers access to their markets. For GATT, these take the form of binding 
commitments on tariffs for goods in general, and combinations of tariffs and 
quotas for some agricultural goods. For GATS, the commitments state how much 
access foreign service providers are allowed for specific sectors, and they include 
lists of types of services where individual countries say they are not applying the 
“most-favoured-nation” principle of non-discrimination.  
Much of the Uruguay Round dealt with the first two parts: general principles and 
principles for specific sectors. At the same time, market access negotiations were possible 
for industrial goods. Once the principles had been worked out, negotiations could proceed 
on the commitments for sectors such as agriculture and services. Negotiations after the 
Uruguay Round have focused largely on market access commitments: financial services, 
basic telecommunications, and maritime transportation (under GATS), and information 
technology (under GATT). 
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b) Additional agreements 
Two other groups of agreements not included in the diagram are also important: 
the agreement on trade policy reviews, and the two “plurilateral” agreements not signed 
by all members: civil aircraft and government procurement. 
c) Specific sectors/Issues dealt with by WTO Agreements (Table 1) 
 
Table 1: Specific sectors/Issues dealt with by WTO Agreements 
 
For goods (under GATT) For services (the GATS annexes) 
• Agriculture 
• Health regulations for farm products 
(SPS) 
• Textiles and clothing 
• Product standards (TBT) 
• Investment measures 
• Anti-dumping measures 
• Customs valuation methods 
• Preshipment inspection 
• Rules of origin 
• Import licensing 
• Subsidies and counter-measures 
• Safeguards 
• Movement of natural persons 
• Air transport 
• Financial services 
• Shipping 
• Telecommunications 
Source: Extracted from WTO(i): “Trading into the Future – the Introduction to 
the WTO”. 
 
It is important to note that WTO Agreements cover many aspects of goods and 
services to ensure the same market for members. The key exceptions at present involve 
farm products and textiles and clothing, which are subject to separate agreements 
involving some quantitative import restrictions still. However, even with these goods, 
better (including faster expanding) access can be negotiated bilaterally as part of acceding 
to the WTO. In general, an import tariff is the only measure that can be used to restrict 
market access. Moreover, that access is guaranteed through upper limits on those tariffs 
(called bindings). Typically, members have made commitments not just to cap them but 
also to phase down over time many of those bound tariff rates. 
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                 d) Dispute Settlement  
The WTO’s procedure for resolving trade disputes under the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding is vital for enforcing the rules and therefore for ensuring that trade flows 
smoothly. 
Countries bring disputes to the WTO if they think their rights under the 
agreements are being infringed. Judgments by specially appointed independent experts 
are based on interpretations of the agreements and individual countries’ commitments. 
The system encourages countries to settle their differences through consultation. 
Failing that, they can follow a carefully mapped out, stage-by-stage procedure that 
includes the possibility of a ruling by a panel of experts, and the chance to appeal the 
ruling on legal grounds. 
Under the WTO, any member country can challenge the governmental activities 
of other member countries. There is a unified and integrated system -- most of WTO 
Agreements are to be decided by the single dispute settlement body with two-level 
procedures: (i) Panel Procedures (ad hoc panel) and (ii) Appellate Body to hear an appeal. 
This dispute settlement mechanism provides quasi-automatic adoption of panel and 
Appellate Body decisions. With adoption, panel and Appellate Body decisions have legal 
binding power to be enforced. In case the losing party did not satisfactorily implement 
panel and Appellate Body recommendation, a winning party may get an authorization 
from the WTO to retaliate in an amount equivalent to the injury2. 
                                               
2 This is different from GATT Dispute Settlement System, in which there was no Appellate Body to appeal; 
Consensus was required to establish a panel and to adopt the panel decision. With objection from a losing 
party, the panel decision is not adopted and thereby had no legal biding power (Ahn, op cit). 
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2.1.4.  The Organization of the WTO 
The WTO’s overriding objective is to help trade flow smoothly, freely, fairly and 
predictably. It does this by: (i) Administering trade agreements;  (ii) Acting as a forum 
for trade negotiations (iii); Settling trade disputes; (iii) Reviewing national trade policies; 
(iii) Assisting developing countries in trade policy issues, through technical assistance 
and training programs; and (iv) Cooperating with other international organizations.     
As of October 2000, The WTO has 136 members, accounting for over 90% of 
world trade. Over 30 others are negotiating membership. 
Under the WTO, decisions are made by the entire membership. This is typically 
by consensus. A majority vote is also possible but it has never been used in the WTO, 
and was extremely rare under the WTO’s predecessor, GATT. The WTO’s agreements 
have been ratified in all members’ parliaments. 
The WTO’s top-level decision-making body is the Ministerial Conference (see 
Chart 2), which meets at least once every two years. Below this is the General Council 
(normally ambassadors and heads of delegation in Geneva, but sometimes officials sent 
from members’ capitals), which meets several times annually in the Geneva headquarters. 
The General Council also meets as the Trade Policy Review Body and the Dispute 
Settlement Body. 
At the next level, the Goods Council, Services Council and Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS) Council report to the General Council.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
16 
 
 
Appellate Body
Dispute Settlement panels 
Chart 2: WTO Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key  
 
      Reporting to General Council (or a subsidiary) 
  Reporting to Dispute Settlement Body 
Plurilateral committees inform the General Council of their activities although 
these agreements are not signed by all WTO members 
 
Source: WTO(i): “Trading into the Future – the Introduction to the WTO”. 
 
 
 
Ministerial Conference 
General Council meeting as 
Trade Policy Review Body 
        General Council meeting 
as      Dispute Settlement Body 
         
General 
Council 
Committees on 
Trade on Environment 
Trade and Development 
Subcommittee on Least- 
Developed Countries 
Regional Trade Agreements 
Balance of Payments 
Restrictions 
Budget, Finance and 
Administration 
 
Working Parties on  
   Accession 
 
Working Parties on  
The Relationship between Trade 
and Investment 
The Interaction between Trade 
and Competition Policy 
Transparency in Government 
Council for 
Trade in Goods 
Council for 
TRIPs 
Council for Trade 
in Services 
Committees on  
Market Access 
Agriculture 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
Technical Barriers to Trade 
Subsides and Countervailing Measures
Anti-Duping Practices  
Customs Valuation  
Rules of Origin 
Import Licensing 
Trade-Related Investment Measures 
Safeguards 
 
Textiles Monitoring Body 
 
Working Parties on  
 
State-Trading Enterprises 
Preshipment Inspection  
 
 
Plurilaterals 
Committee on Trade in Civil Aircraft 
Committee on Government 
Procurement 
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Numerous specialized committees, working groups and working parties deal with 
the individual agreements and other areas such as the environment, development, 
membership applications and regional trade agreements. 
 
2.2. Accession Procedure 
 
2.2.1. Relevant WTO Provisions 
 
Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organisation deals with accession.  The full text of this provision reads as follows: 
"1. Any State or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in 
the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters 
provided for in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements may 
accede to this Agreement, on terms to be agreed between it and the WTO.  
Such accession shall apply to this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements annexed thereto. 
2. Decisions on accession shall be taken by the Ministerial Conference.  
The Ministerial Conference shall approve the agreement on the terms of 
accession by a two-thirds majority of the Members of the WTO. 
3. Accession to a Plur ilateral Trade Agreement shall be governed by the 
provisions of that Agreement." [WTO (d) – WT/ACC/7/Rev.1]. 
Perhaps the most striking thing about WTO Article XII is its brevity.  It gives no 
guidance on the "terms to be agreed", these being left to negotiations between the WTO 
Members and the applicant.  Nor does it lay down any procedures to be used for 
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negotiating these terms, these being left to individual Working Parties to agree.  These have 
evolved separately as will be seen in the next section of this paper.  In this, it follows closely the 
corresponding Article XXXIII of GATT 1947. 
A number of other WTO provisions are relevant to accession - for instance:   
§ Article XVI.1, lays down that "Except as otherwise provided under this Agreement or the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements, the WTO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and 
customary practices followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 and the 
bodies established in the framework of GATT 1947";  
§ Article XII:2 states that "Decisions on accession shall be taken by the Ministerial 
Conference", Article IV:2 makes it clear that "In the intervals between meetings of the 
Ministerial Conference, its functions shall be conducted by the General Council";   
§ Article IX deals with decision-making.  On 15 November 1995 the General Council agreed to 
procedures regarding decision-making under Articles IX and XII of the WTO Agreement, 
which clarified the relation between these two provisions (WT/GC/M/8, page 6);   
§ Article XIII provides that: 
 "1. This Agreeme nt and the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annexes 1 and 2 
shall not apply as between any Member and any other Member if either of the 
Members, at the time either becomes a Member, does not consent to such 
application. 
3. Paragraph 1 shall apply between a Member and another Member which has 
acceded under Article XII only if the Member not consenting to the application has so 
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notified the Ministerial Conference before the approval of the agreement on the terms of 
accession by the Ministerial Conference." [WTO (b) -  WT/ACC/1]. 
2.2.2. The Accession Process 
(a) General Procedure  
The organisation and pursuit of the accession negotiations in each Working Party follow 
a well-established pattern based on procedures set out in a note by the Secretariat, WT/ACC/1 
[WTO ( b)] of 24 March 1995.  
WT/ACC/1 sets out the different stages in the accession process.  It notes that the General 
Council considers applications to accede under WTO Article XII and the establishment of a 
Working Party.  The Working Party first conducts a factual examination of the trade regime of 
the acceding government on the basis of a Memorandum presented by the acceding government 
and replies to questions from Members.  The actual multilateral work commences with the 
submission of a Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime by the applicant government.  At an 
appropriate moment, it moves on to negotiate the terms of accession, which relate to three main 
areas:  WTO rules, on goods, TRIPS and services.  When agreed, the Report of the Working 
Party, inc luding a draft Decision and Protocol of Accession, is forwarded to the General Council.  
The Protocol, which contains a single package of agreed commitments on rules; concessions and 
commitments on goods; and specific commitments on services, sets out the terms on which the 
applicant is invited to join WTO.  Following the General Council's adoption of the Report and 
approval of the draft Decision, the acceding government becomes a Member of the WTO thirty 
days after it accepts its Protocol of Accession. 
It seems simple, however, it fact it is quite complicated and time consuming.  The process 
of accession to the WTO can be divided into an introductory phase of formalities and three 
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substantive phases. The three substantive phases involve: (a) the applicant's  preparation of a 
Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime (hereafter referred to as the "Memorandum") 
describing in detail its policies and institutions that have a bearing on the conduct of international 
trade; (b) the members' fact finding phase; (c) the negotiation phase. 
After a country sends a letter to the Director General of the WTO expressing its desire in 
acceding to the Organization, the request is considered by the WTO General Council, which 
consists of representatives of all members and which meets frequently during the course of the 
year. The General Council routinely decides to set up a working party (WP) with appropriate 
terms of reference to consider the accession application and nominates its chairman 3 . 
Membership of WP is open to all members of the WTO. In the case of large countries such as 
China or Russia, a large number of countries participate, in the case of smaller countries, usually 
only the "quad" countries, Canada, EC, Japan and the US, plus Australia, New Zealand, 
Switzerland, a few of the larger trading developing countries as well as some neighbouring 
countries which are significant trading partners. This phase can be quite short. 
The first substantive phase, involving the preparation of a Memorandum on the Foreign 
Trade Regime by the applicant explaining its policies and institutions, can be a very demanding 
task, because of the range of issues that the memorandum has to address and the degree of detail 
required. The issues include much more than simply trade in goods and services -- although the 
latter, which encompasses the financial sector, insurance, telecommunications, professional 
services etc. is a large task in and of itself. They range over various aspects of macroeconomic 
policy, especially related to foreign exchange management and controls, investment and 
competition policy, protection of intellectual and other property rights, as well as enterprise 
                                               
3  Usually an Ambassador, permanent representative to the WTO of one of its members. Countries 
frequently request and obtain observer status at the WTO, which permits them to familiarize themselves 
with the institution and its procedures, prior to a formal request for accession. 
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privatization. The preparation of this report is the sole responsibility of the applicant -- and so are 
any delays in its preparation.  
To the extent that the original Memorandum is done quickly but is incomplete in its 
details or the legislation and practices inconsistent with WTO provisions, the more protracted is 
the subsequent question and answer period. Sometimes, members have asked the WTO 
Secretariat to review draft Memoranda before their circulation so as to prevent incomplete 
documentation from being circulated. But the Secretariat does not assume any responsibility 
regarding the contents of the Memorandum. 
Questions and Answers. Once the memorandum has been circulated to the WP 
members, the accession process enters the second and, in most cases, the most time 
consuming process, which consists of members asking questions and obtaining 
clarifications on the applicant's policies and institutions, either based on the 
memorandum or on independent evidence about the situation gathered by the members. 
The first part of the process involves the initial questions and answers regarding the 
policies and institutions based on the applicant's Memorandum. The Working Party 
typically does not meet until the Memorandum and the initial questions and answers have 
been distributed. It is followed by further questions and answers of clarification, which 
can take several working party meetings sometimes covering a period of several years. 
(Michalopoulos 1998). 
(b) Procedure and status for countries in transition 
The WTO treaties contain very few provisions regarding the countries in 
transition. The major exceptions are that such countries are given more time to implement 
GATT provisions regarding the elimination of export subsidies as well as the 
implementing legislation under Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Thus, 
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the major challenge faced by each country in the process of accession is to enact the laws, 
develop the institutions and apply the policies that would enable it to conform to the 
fundamental rules and disciplines of the WTO. This is a major challenge for countries in 
transition, which have to make fundamental changes in the laws, institutions and policies 
governing international trade. 
Countries in transition have viewed membership in the World Trade Organisation, 
within which the rules for the conduct of international trade are set and administered, as 
essential to their full integration in the international economy. Accordingly, in the 
aftermath of the collapse of central planning and the breakup of the Soviet Union, most 
countries in transition, which were not members, applied to accede to the GATT and then 
the WTO. Those like Hungary, Poland and Romania, which had joined GATT under 
special Protocols, renegotiated them in the early 1990's and joined the WTO at its 
establishment. After a decade, accept for countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
three from the Former Soviet Union - Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic and Latvia- other 
countries in transition are still in different stages of accession to the WTO (see Table 2). 
The processing is slow because (Michalopoulos C. 1999): 
· Legislative requirements needed for accession are time-consuming; 
· Candidate countries are weak institutionally and unfamiliar with the 
economic and legal issues to be addressed; 
· The fact finding process is unnecessary cumbersome and time-consuming; 
· Technical assistance to applicants in meeting the requirements for WTO 
accession is not effectively coordinated; 
· Addressing the commercial interests of all members requires prostrated 
negotiations.  
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Table 2: Timetable of Accessions to the WTO 
 
Government Date of WP 
Establishment 
Date of 
Circulation of 
Memorandum 
Date of 
Circulation 
of First 
Q&A 
Draft WP 
Report 
Report 
adopted 
by 
Council 
Member 
-ship 
Armenia Dec 1993 Apr 1995 Sep 1995 Mar 1997   
Azerbaijan Jul 1997 - -    
Belarus Oct 1993 Jan 1996 Jun 1997 -   
Estonia Mar 1994 Mar 1994 Oct 1994 Nov 
1998 
 May 99 Nov 99 
Georgia Jul 1996 Apr 1997 Sep 1997    
Kazakhstan Feb 1996 Sep 1996 Jan 1997    
Kyrgyz Rep. Apr 1996 Aug 1996 Jan 1997 Apr 1998 Oct 98 Dec 98 
Latvia Dec 1993 Aug 1994 Feb 1995 Dec 1996 Oct 98 Feb 99 
Lithuania Feb 1994 Dec 1994 Sep 1995 Jun 1997   
Moldova Dec 1993 Sep 1996 May 1997 Jul 1999   
Russia Jun 1993 Mar 1994 Jun 1995 -   
Ukraine Dec 1993 Jul 1994 Feb 1995 -   
Uzbekistan Dec 1994 - - -   
Albania Dec 1992 Jan 1995 Sep 1995 Jul 1999   
Cambodia Dec 1994 - - -   
China Mar 1987 Feb 1987 Nov 1987 Dec 1994   
Croatia Oct 1993 Jun 1994 Aug 1995 Apr 1999   
FYR 
Macedonia 
Dec 1994 - - -   
Laos Feb 1998 - -    
Vietnam Jan 1995 Oct 1996 Mar 1998 1999   
Algeria Jun 1987 Jul 1996 Jul 1997    
Andorra Oct 1997 - -    
Nepal Jun 1989 Feb 1990 Nov 1990    
Oman Jun 1996 Oct 1996 Mar 1997    
Saudi 
Arabia 
Jun 1993 Jul 1994 Nov 1995    
Seychelles Jul 1995 Aug 1996 Jan 1997    
Sudan  Oct 1994 - -    
Chinese 
Taipei 
Sep 1992 Oct 1992 Mar 1993 Mar 1998 
 
  
Tonga Nov 1995 - -    
Vanuatu Jul 1995 Nov 1995 May 1996    
Source: Drawn from WTO (WT/ACC/1), (WT/ACC/7/Rev. 1,2) and Michalopoulos C. 
(1999).   
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For countries in transition, there is an important provision to the application of 
non-discrimination rules. It is that the acceding country has completed bilateral 
negotiations with each WTO member and that each of those members consents to the 
accession of the new member. Otherwise, according to GATT Article XXV, a WTO 
member has right to deny MFN treatment (Ahn op cit.). The US and EU have designated 
many former centrally planned economies ‘non-market’ economies an use it to apply 
different, less transparent and potentially discriminatory practices in their determination 
of anti-dumping and their use of safeguards against imports from those economies. The 
US also has used it to link MFN access to freedom of immigration and other human right 
issues under section 402 of US trade law (the Jackon-Vanik Amendment of 1974 Trade 
Act).  
2.3. WTO Principles and Implications for Vietnam 
Becoming a WTO member can bring about both benefit and cost for Vietnam, it 
offers rights but with them come obligations; it provides new opportunities but also some 
challenges. Evidently the net benefits are overwhelmingly positive, given that 136 
countries are members and more than 30 others have applied to joint. To be an outsider of 
this trading system is a big disadvantage for Vietnam. To become a WTO member, as 
above described, there are many principles and principles to be met, entry conditions and 
formal procedures to be followed. Occasionally the principles and obligations upset 
political sensitivities because some groups within a country may lose a privilege (e.g., 
protection from import competition), but almost invariably those rules boost the overall 
economy of each WTO member. As summarized by Rodrick (1995), the general benefits 
that come from the freer trade those principles encourage include the following: 
  
 
 
25 
 
 
· Better allocation of national resources towards industries with the strongest 
comparative advantage; 
· Enhanced learning and newer technologies from interacting more with the rest of 
the world; 
· Greater flexibility, via trade for dealing with shock such as natural disasters; and  
· Less wasteful rent-seeking lobbying activities by groups seeking government 
assistance and protection. 
Three specific benefits of WTO membership are greater and more secure market 
access abroad for a country’s exports, availability of a dispute settlement mechanism, and 
greater discipline at home in sound economic policy-making. 
One the first if these, WTO principles, and particularly GATT Articles I and III, 
ensure that a member’s exporters are entitled to non-discriminatory treatment by other 
WTO members in terms of their access to their markets. This is very important for 
Vietnam as a country in transition, being a WTO member ensures that it does not have to 
go to the United States government every year to plead for MFN status in US market. 
Nor can the US unilaterally impose tighter restrictions on access to another WTO 
member’s exports for say, its own domestic political reasons: its tariffs must remain at or 
below the bound rates, and for each tariff item the tariff rate must be the same for all 
WTO members (Anderson 1998). 
Secondly, if the member feels another member is not playing by the rules, it can 
challenge to the dispute settlement body for resolving the issue. Thanks to the Uruguay 
Round, the dispute settlement mechanism is now much stronger, faster, impartial, and 
biding than was the case under GATT prior to 1995. As a result, members are less 
inclined to bend or break WTO principles and, if they do, other members have reasonable 
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chance of bringing them back into line and/or being compensated. This ensures much 
greater security of access to markets for WTO members as compared with non-members. 
And thirdly, Because WTO principles also apply to one’s own policies; 
membership brings discipline to economic policymaking at home as well.  
More specifically, Vietnam will be required to tariffy its non-tariff import 
restrictions, bind them, and agree to phasing down in those bound rates over time; to free 
up in services over time with specific commitments recorded in its schedules; to 
strengthen and enforce its intellectual property rights legislation; to reduce state support 
for enterprises; to limit any domestic support for agriculture (accept for R&D) and to 
enforce WTO principles uniformly and predictably.  
All trade and trade-related policy measures must be notified to the WTO 
Secretariat. This adds to domestic policy transparency, making it more difficult for 
interest groups to be protected without detection. The WTO Agreements require Vietnam 
a single enquiry point where WTO members can seek information on policies covered by 
those agreements (e.g. TBT, SPS, TRIPs and GATS). Vietnam is also required to inform 
the WTO Secretariat each year if any significant policy changes occur, to provide 
statistical information annually in a set format, and to undertake with the Secretariat a 
comprehensive review of the member’s trade and trade-related policies and practices 
(Anderson op cit.).  
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PART III. TRADE LIBERALIZATION PROCESS IN VIETNAM 
 
 
3.1. The Role of Trade Liberalization in Vietnam’s Development Strategy 
The government of Vietnam has recognized that further trade liberalization is an 
integral part in the broader strategy for economic integration and development; and has 
identified the key elements of its economic reform agenda as follows (WB, ADB and 
UNDP, Vietnam Development Report 2001): 
· Raising the efficiency and competitiveness of the economy; 
· Stepping up reform of state enterprises; 
· Creating a healthy financial system; 
· Combining economic growth and cultural development to achieve social justice 
and progress and to protect the environment; and  
· Ensuring agricultural and rural development. 
Trade liberalization has a critical role  in achieving these objectives. As in any 
country, macroeconomic management and trade, foreign investment, competition and 
regulatory policies shape the environment in which industrial restructuring occurs, along 
with the legal and administrative framework governing enterprise development. But 
Vietnam’s transition to a market economy, the legacy of central planning and the 
extensive direct role of the state in industrial production mean that trade liberalization 
and industry policy reform are linked to almost every aspect of economic policy and state 
activity. 
For these reasons, a realistic strategy for sustained economic growth has to 
encompass a wide range of concerns. It must emphasize pushing forward with the 
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transition to a market economy. Actions must be taken across a wide front, and these 
actions will be strongly interconnected, including (CIE, 1999): 
· Industry policies, dealing with the main macro and microeconomic policies 
shaping the environment for decentralized decision making and the investment 
and production decisions of state and private enterprises; 
· Enterprise development, covering the regulatory environment for enterprise 
formation and development, and the process of SOE divestiture and reform; 
· Factor markets, dealing with actions required to promote development of efficient 
markets for land, labor and capital; and  
· Institutional development issues addressing the need to foster development of 
market institutions, strengthen the legal framework for business transactions, and 
to create a sound and competitive financial sector to mobilize finance for 
industrial sector activities. 
Trade and industry policy reform is central to the government’s strategy for a 
number of reasons, related primarily to the role that open trade policies can play as a 
means of ensuring competitiveness and efficiency of resource allocation, and of 
disciplining enterprise investment and production decisions. This becomes apparent 
because international trade is as a technological process for transforming locally 
produced goods and services into goods and services made in other countries. It offers 
alternative way of supplying the goods and services that the Vietnamese people want to 
purchase. 
Seen as a production technology, international trade also provides a benchmark 
for efficiency of local production. If local producers can produce at the same cost in local 
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resources and factors of production as it takes to acquire goods through trade, then they 
are using those resources efficiently. Conversely, if local producers can only generate 
adequate returns if prices are much higher than international prices, then there is a strong 
presumption that they are using resources inefficiently, and that those resources would 
generate greater benefits to the country if they were used in other activities. 
 
 
Box 1: Comparative Advantage 
 
What did the classical economist David Ricardo mean when he coined the term 
comparative advantage? 
 
Suppose country A is better than country B at making automobiles and country B is 
better than country A at making bread. It is obvious (the academics would say “trivial”) 
that both would benefit if A specialized in automobiles, B specialized in bread and they 
traded their products. That is a case of absolute advantage. 
 
But what if a country is bad at making everything? Will trade drive all producers out of 
business? The answer, according to Ricardo, is no. The reason is the principle 
of comparative advantage, arguably the single most powerful insight in economics. 
 
According to the principle of comparative advantage, countries A and B still stand to 
benefit from trading with each other even if A is better than B at making everything, both 
automobiles and bread. If A is much more superior at making automobiles and only 
slightly superior at making bread, then A should still invest resources in what it does best 
—  producing automobiles — and export the product to B.  B should still invest in what it 
does best —  making bread — and export that product to A, even if it is not as efficient as 
A. Both would still benefit from the trade. A country does not have to be best at anything 
to gain from trade. That is comparative advantage.  
 
The theory is one of the most widely accepted among economists. It is also one of the 
most misunderstood among non-economists because it is confused with absolute 
advantage. It is often claimed, for example, that some countries have no comparative 
advantage in anything. That is virtually impossible.  
 
Source: Adopted from WTO (a): Introducing the WTO.  
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3.2. Changes in Trade Policy since Doi moi (Renovation) 
3.2.1. Key policy changes and developments 
Changes in trade and foreign exchange policy, along with liberalization of 
controls on foreign investment, have been key features of the opening up of the 
Vietnamese economy since the introduction of doi moi. As a result of these changes, the 
trade regime —and Vietnam’s trade performance — has undergone a significant 
transformation. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) described the pre-reform trade 
system in Vietnam as follows: 
Before the reforms, foreign trade in Vietnam was subject to central decisions by 
the planning authorities and could be carried out only by a small number of state trading 
monopolies. Domestic prices were isolated from the influence of international prices 
through a complex system of multiple exchange rates and trade subsidies. Exports were 
discouraged through overvalued exchange rates and low procurement prices, while 
imports were impeded by an extensive system of quotas and licenses. Isolated from the 
world market, Vietnam relied heavily on its former CMEA partners to obtain basic 
commodities, such as petroleum products and fertilizers, while exporters were obliged to 
fulfill CMEA quotas (arranged through a system of government-to-government 
protocols) before they were allowed to export to the convertible currency area. (IMF 
1996.) 
To be able to identify ways of further trade liberalization and fulfil the 
requirements of becoming a WTO member, it is useful to summarize the evolution of the 
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current situation, based on that to evaluate what have been done and to make 
recommendations on what should be done. 
The introduction in 1986 of doi moi, Vietnam’s wide ranging process of economic 
restructuring, formally ushered in a period of profound changes in the institutional and 
policy environment for economic development. Fundamental changes in the underlying 
approach to economic management, and efforts to introduce the institutional 
underpinnings of a market-oriented economy, have been implemented in a relatively 
short period of time. The economy has responded impressively to these changes, and has 
weathered shocks, such as the collapse of the former Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance and the withdrawal of Soviet support. 
Some of the key elements of the restructuring and renovation process are listed in 
box 3.2. These structural changes have been associated with a strong stabilization effort, 
involving hardening state owned enterprise (SOE) budget constraints, increasing 
revenues and reducing expenditures, and controls over monetary expansion. This effort 
ended a long period of hyperinflation, and had a strong impact on confidence in the dong 
and in the emerging financial system. At the same time, the government has sought to 
cement Vietnam’s entry into the multilateral and regional trading system and to 
regularize trading relationships on a bilateral basis. 
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Box 2: Key elements of the Restructuring and Renovation Process 
· Reversal of the process of collectivization of agriculture, by granting individuals 
and families rights to land. 
· Price liberalization, to eliminate the ‘two price’ system that prevailed under the 
old system, and removal of barriers to internal trade. 
· Significant steps toward creation of a modern banking system, by splitting off the 
commercial banking functions of the State Bank of Vietnam, and facilitating the 
establishment of new foreign and domestically owned banking institutions. 
· Partial liberalization of controls on foreign investment and international trade. 
· Foreign exchange market reforms and shifting to a more market determined 
exchange rate system. Steps toward reform of the state owned enterprise system, 
through enterprise restructuring, introduction of new approaches for management 
and oversight and changing the relationship between SOEs and the budget and the 
financial sector. Formal acceptance of the role of the private sector, and creation 
of the legal framework for the functioning of a corporate sector. 
· Budgetary reform, to change the basis of revenue raising to a more modern 
system of taxation, and adopt formalized expenditure planning and control 
systems. 
Source: Adopted from Vietnam Trade Policy (CIE, 1998). 
 
Regarding trade liberalization, initial steps were taken in the late 1980s4. Trade 
reforms gained momentum in early 1990s, slowed in the middle 1990’s and picked up 
steam again from 1998. Between 1991 and 1995, private firms were allowed to engage in 
foreign trade by obtaining a license, tariff exemptions were simplified, an inter-bank 
foreign exchange market was introduced, and quotas on exports were removed except for 
rice. 
                                               
4 In 1988, the crucial step of abolishing the central government’s monopoly on trade and in reducing the 
customs tariff was taken. In 1989, quotas were removed on all but few export and several import 
commodities, the rates of export duties were reduced, the foreign exchange system was unified, and 
producers were allowed to sell to any licensed foreign trade company.  
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Since 1998 the trade regime has been opened up further. The most significant 
measure was freeing-up of trading rights for firms registered in Vietnam. These firms 
were allowed for the first time, to export and import goods directly without a license. 
This newly provided right for domestic firms encouraged significant participation of 
private firms in foreign trade. The domestic private sectors’ share in the value of non-oil 
export rose from 12 percent in 1997 to 22 percent in mid-2000 and in import value, from 
4 percent to 16 percent (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Shares in Non-oil Exports and total Imports 
 Non-oil Exports Total Imports 
 1997 Mid-2000 1997 Mid-2000 
State-owned enterprises 65 46 68 57 
Foreign-invested enterprises 23 32 28 27 
Domestic private SMEs 12 22 4 16 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Ministry of Trade 
Although doi moi had been preceded by a number of experiments with 
liberalizing the domestic economy (such as, the 1979 introduction of a contract system 
for agriculture and the legalization of ‘fence-breaking’ by SOEs), changes affecting 
Vietnam’s interactions with international markets really only started in 1987 with the 
introduction of a new law on foreign investment. 
Table 4 presents a chronology of some key changes in policies toward 
international trade and investment, and the foreign exchange system.  
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Table 4: Major Changes in Trade Policy since Doi moi  
Year Changes in Trade Policy Other Reforms 
1986  § VI Party Congress declares 
beginning of doi moi  
1987 § Law on Foreign Investment —
Introduction of ‘open door’ policy 
§ Land law establishes private use 
of allocated land in agriculture 
§ Creation of central treasury to 
execute the budget 
1988 § Foreign exchange control decree 
liberalizes retention of foreign exchange, 
opening of foreign currency accounts, use of 
transfers to pay for imports and repay foreign 
loans 
§ Devaluation of trade and invisible 
payments exchange rates 
§ Restrictions on establishment of foreign 
trading organization relaxed and central 
government monopoly of foreign trade 
terminated 
§ Law on Import and Export Duties 
introduces the customs tariff 
§ Creation of two-tier banking 
system 
§ Cooperative method of 
agriculture production abandoned in 
favor of households 
§ Farming households given long-
term rights to use land for 
agricultural production 
 
§ Official policy of encouraging 
private enterprises  
 
1989 § Quotas removed on all but ten export and 
14 import commodities (subsequently 
reduced to seven export and 12 import 
commodities) 
§ Requirement that SOEs fulfill CMEA 
export targets before exporting to convertible 
currency area removed 
§ Number of export commodities subject 
to duties reduced from 30 to 12 and most 
rates reduced 
§ Producers of exportables allowed to sell 
to any appropriately licensed foreign trade 
companies 
§ Number of import commodities subject 
to duties reduced from 124 to 80, range of 
rates expanded from 5-50 per cent to 5-120 
per cent. 
§ Foreign exchange rate system unified 
§ All budgetary export subsidies removed  
§ Nearly all forms of direct 
subsidization of production and 
price control removed – end of ‘two 
price’ system.  
§ Domestic trading in gold 
legalized 
§ Ordinance on Economic 
Contracts establishes rights for legal 
entities to enter into contracts 
§ Bank interest rates made 
possible in real terms 
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Table 4: (Continued) 
1990 § Special sales taxes introduced 
§ Turnover tax and profit tax 
introduced 
§ Law Foreign Investment revised  
§ Special import duties imposed on 
selected goods such as mopeds and 
tourist vehicles 
§ General export- import companies 
required to register with regulatory 
organization for individual commodities 
§ Exports of certain commodities 
limited to member relevant exporters 
associations 
 
§ Law for State Bank and 
National Law on Banks, 
Cooperative Credit Institutions 
and Financial Institutions 
enacted, Prohibiting SBVN from 
commercial banking and 
empowering it as central bank 
§ Law on Private Enterprises 
establishes legal basis for 
establishment of sole 
proprietorships 
§ Law on Companies 
establishes legal basis for limited 
liability and shareholder business 
entities  
1991 § Foreign exchange trading floors 
opened at SBVN  
§ Regulation on setting up export 
processing zones (EPZs) promulgated  
§ Export duty on rice reduced from 10 
per cent to 1 per cent  
§ Imported inputs used to produce 
exports exempted from duty 
§ Private companies allowed to directly 
engage in international trade 
§ Ordinance on Civil contracts 
establishes legal basis for most 
forms of contract 
§ Decrees establish rights of 
SOEs to manage assets, provide 
rule for SOE formation and 
initiate registration review which 
leads to major rationalization of 
SOE sector 
§ Agriculture Bank of Vietnam 
allowed to lend to households 
1992 § Harmonized system of tariff 
nomenclature introduction 
§ Foreign investment law amended to 
reduce discrimination in favor of joint-
ventures against 100 per cent foreign-
owned enterprises, and to introduce 
build-operate- transfer (BOT) concept for 
infrastructure projects 
§ Trade agreement signed European 
Union (EU) establishes quota on exports 
of textiles and clothing to EU and grants 
tariff preference on selected imports from 
EU 
§ New Constitution allows 
individuals to exercise property 
rights over income producing 
assets and personal property 
§ Pilot equitization program for 
SOEs introduced 
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Table 4: (continued) 
 
1993 § Export shipment licensing relaxed –
six monthly licenses issued for 22 export 
commodities  
§ 90 day duty suspension system for 
inputs into export production introduced 
§ Tariff and revenue laws amended to 
add provisions for other than normal 
importation (such as, goods in transit) 
§ Vietnam joined Customs Cooperation 
Council 
§ United Nations (UN) layout key for 
customs declaration adopted 
§ New Land Law makes 
agriculture land user rights 
transferable and useable as 
collateral 
§ Laws on bankruptcy and 
environmental protection 
promulgated  
1994 § Elimination of import permits for all 
but 15 products 
§ Responsibility to initiate change in 
tariff passes from Ministry of Finance to 
Ministry of Trade  
§ Vietnam gains GATT observer status 
§ Introduction of interbank foreign 
exchange market 
§ Steps in process of licensing to 
engage in international trade reduced 
from three to two 
§ Duty exemption system for exports 
extended to suspend duty payment for 90 
days 
§ Export shipment licensing further 
relaxed –completely lifted for all 
commodities except rice, timber and 
petroleum  
§ Economic Court established 
§ Labor Code establishes 
protection of employer and 
employee rights, regulation of 
contracts, social insurance and 
sets up arbitration mechanism 
§ Law on Promotion of 
Domestic Investment, elaborates 
roles of different levels of 
governments in licensing and 
lays out initiatives for domestic 
investment 
§ Pilot work on creation of 
general corporations as 
groupings of SOEs initiated  
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Table 4: (continued) 
 
1995 § Coverage of export quotas reduced to 
one commodity—rice  
§ Export tax rates raised on 11 products  
§ Vietnam joins ASEAN and accedes 
to protocols of membership of AFTA 
§ Reduction in number of turnover tax 
rates from 18 to 11 
§ Requirement for importers to get 
import permits on a by shipment basis 
eliminated for a wide range of consumer 
and producer goods 
§ Range of goods subject to 
management by import quota reduced to 
seven 
§ 1996 list of goods under the common 
effective preferential tariff (CEPT) for 
AFTA promulgated  
§ Major reorganization of ministries 
establishes leading role of Ministry of 
Planning and Investment (MPI) in 
approval and regulation of foreign 
investment 
§ New regulations on land 
limits nature of land use rights 
for private sector and erodes 
right to mortgage land use rights 
held by domestic organizations 
§ General Department for 
monitoring the State Capital and 
Assets in State Enterprises 
created in Ministry of Finance to 
improve supervision and 
management of SOEs 
§ Law on State Enterprises 
consolidates previous legislative 
initiatives on SOEs 
§ Civil Code enacted to lay 
foundation for market economy. 
Establishes inter alia legal 
protection of industrial property 
rights 
 
1996 § Maximum tariff rate reduced to 80 
percent special sales tax imposed at rates 
up to 100 percent on imported (but not 
locally produced) passenger cars 
following reduction in tariff rate 
§ List of commodities under CEPT of 
AFTA for 1997 promulgated 
§ New law on Foreign Investment 
reduces scope of import duty exemptions 
for foreign investment projects 
§ Inward foreign exchange remittance 
tax lifted 
§ Import-export policy decision for 996 
reduces number of goods managed by 
import quota o six  
§ Credit activities exempted 
from turnover tax 
§ Law on State Budget 
formalizes budgetary practice 
and defines revenue and 
expenditure responsibilities of 
different levels of government 
§ First Public Investment 
Program (PIP) authorized  
§ Law on Materials lays out 
framework for exploitation of 
mineral resources 
§ Regulations elaborate regime 
under Civil Code for protection 
of industrial property rights 
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Table 4: (continued) 
 
1997 § Decree allocates rice export quotas to 
provincial People’s Committees as well 
as agencies under central management 
thus opening the way for direct export by 
the private sector. All distractions on 
domestic trade in rice abolished 
§ Imports of sugar prohibited. Number 
of goods subject to import quotas to 
achieve natural balances increases 
§ Temporary prohibitions imposed on 
imports of wide range of consumer goods 
then lifted 
§ Approval of certain investment 
projects decentralized to selected 
people’s committees and industrial zones 
§ Import stamp system introduced as 
anti-smuggling measure 
§ Law on Credit Institutions 
establishes basis for supervision 
and regulation of banking system 
§ Law on Sate Bank of 
Vietnam specifies role and 
functions of SBVN, but still fails 
to give SVN autonomy in setting 
monetary policy 
§ Law on Value-added Tax 
announces introduction of VAT 
in 1999 to replace turnover tax 
§ Law on Corporate Income 
Tax announces introduction of 
company tax in 1999 to replace 
profit tax 
§ Law on Cooperatives 
confirms continued government 
support for cooperative business 
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Table 4: (continued) 
 
1998 § Forward and swap foreign exchange 
transactions authorized 
§ Foreign invested enterprises allowed to 
export goods not specified in investment 
license  
§ Highest tariff rate reduced to 60 percent 
§ Informal road map of CEPT tariff 
reductions to 2006 issued 
§ List of commodities under CEPT for 1998 
promulgated, completing coverage of inclusion 
list 
§ Management of imports of most of 
consumer goods shifted to tariffs rather than 
quotas or licensing  
§ Decision to allocate rice export and 
fertilize import quota to private sector 
enterprises announced 
§ Domestic enterprises authorized to directly 
export production without an export/import 
license 
 
§ Partial surrender requirements imposed on 
enterprises holding foreign exchange accounts 
§ Restrictions imposed on imports of alcohol 
§ Use of minimum price list for valuation of 
import by foreign invested enterprises 
terminated 
§ Amendment to import/export law 
introduces 3 schedule tariff, and provision for 
antidumping and countervailing duty 
§ Special sales tax amended, partially 
extending tax to local motor vehicles, 
increasing rates on luxuries 
§ General conditions and procedures for 
Vietnamese enterprises to undertake 
international trading activities simplified with 
elimination of requirement for licensing by 
Ministry of Trade. 
§ Incentives for domestic 
investment extended and 
access simplified  
§ Taxpayer identification 
numbering system 
introduced 
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Table 4: (continued) 
 
1999 § Issued implementing regulations to free up 
rights of all firms to export and import directly 
all products listed in firm’s business license 
without requiring license. Exporters are given 
rights to export products not listed in their 
license (Jan) 
§ Issued implementing  regulations to reduce 
the number of tariff rates to 12 (from 26) and 
the maximum tariff to 50 percent (from 60) 
except for six categories of goods 
§ Permitted private firms to export rice.  
 
2000 § Quantitative restrictions (QRs) were 
removed from 8 of the 19 items subject to 
QRs. 
§ Bilateral Trade Agreement signed with the 
United State 
 
Source: Official Circulars (various editions); Fforde and deVylder (1996); World Bank 
(1993, 1994, 1995, 2000); Fforde and Goldstone (1995); CIE (1998); Viet Law (various 
editions); Freshfields (various editions). 
 
3.2.2. Trade, Exchange and Foreign Investment Policies 
Liberalization of Vietnam’s trade and exchange system has involved actions on 
six main fronts: 
· Phasing out of foreign exchange controls and adoption of a more market oriented 
exchange rate policy, accompanying large scale restructuring of the financial 
system; 
· Relaxation of controls on entry into foreign trading activities; 
· Relaxation of controls used to manage imports and exports; 
· Creation and amendment of a system of taxation of imports and exports, as part of 
a comprehensive change in the revenue raising system; and  
· Joining regional and multilateral trading arrangements. 
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These actions have accompanied efforts to create a legal and regulatory 
framework to permit and encourage foreign investment. 
Exchange Reform 
The major steps in exchange reform have been: 
· Unification of the multiple exchange rate system that prevailed until 1989 
following large devaluation to eliminate serious overvaluation of official rates; 
· Liberalization of controls on retention of foreign exchange and use of transfers 
from abroad —  allowing firms that meet surrender requirements to open foreign 
currency accounts and sell foreign exchange at prevailing exchange rates, and 
allowing foreign transfers to be used to pay for imported goods and services and 
make outward transfers; 
· Establishment of an interbank market in 1994 following the setting up of trading 
floors at the State Bank in 1994; and 
· Pursuit of a market oriented exchange rate policy that has all but eliminated 
differentials between the official and parallel exchange markets. 
These changes in foreign exchange management have been accompanied by a 
restructuring of the banking sector —  to create a two-tier system from the old monobank, 
and open up entry to new and foreign banks —  and monetary policies aimed at increasing 
confidence in the local currency and financial system. 
3.3. Trade Achievements in Recent Years 
 Changes in trade policies have been an essential component of the doi moi policy 
implemented in Vietnam since 1986. Over the years, most export quotas have been lifted 
and export taxes have been reduced to generally low levels (World Bank, 2000). In 
addition, export activities by private sector (both domestic and foreign) have been 
increasingly encouraged, thus breaking the trade monopoly of a small number of state-
owned enterprises. These reforms – together with sound macroeconomic management 
have led to a rapid export and import growth. As it can be seen in Table 5, between 1992 
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and 1997 (the period before the Asian economic Crisis), the dollar value of imports and 
exports roughly quadrupled (to $11,592 million and $9,185 million respectively), raising 
the share of trade in GDP from 52 percent to 86 percent – a high share by any standard. 
Table 5: Increased Openness 
 1992 1997 
Value of exports (US$ million)  2,581 9,185 
Value of imports (US$ million)  2,540 11,592 
(Exports+Imports)/GDP (%) 52 86 
Source: General Statistical Office (GSO) 
 The structure of exports also changed. During the 1990s, Vietnam started to 
exploit its comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufactures. Table 6 shows that 
export growth was led by light manufactures, dominated by the garment and footwear 
sectors. Between 1990 and 1999, the share of light manufactures in total exports rose 
from 13 percent to 37 percent. It is also noticeable that, despite the shrinking share of 
agricultural goods in total exports, there was a strong rise in the volume of rice exports. 
In only few years, Vietnam turned from being a net rice importer into the world’s second 
largest exporter. 
Table 6: The change in Export Structure 
 Share in total Exports in 
1992 (%) 
Share in total Export 
in1997 (%) 
Total Export 100 100 
Agriculture 50 35 
Heavy industry and minerals 37 28 
Light Industry 13 37 
Of which:   
     Textiles and garments n.a 16 
     Footwear n.a 11 
Source: General Statistical Office (GSO) 
 The Asian crisis has interrupted Vietnam’s trade expansion. In 1998, exports 
increased by a sluggish 2.1 percent. To avoid an external deficit, the Government 
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imposed additional import restrictions which, together with slumping domestic demand, 
led to a 0.8 percent decrease in the value of imports. This downturn in export 
performance was the general phenomenon in the region. However, in 1999 it was a 
surprising recovery in Vietnam export performance. Table 7 shows that in 1999, 
Vietnam’s exports grew by an impressive 23.4 percent, much faster than in most other 
Asian countries.  
Table 7: Strong Export Growth in 1999 
Countries Export growth in 1999 
(%) 
Thailand 7.4 
Malaysia 15.3 
Indonesia 0.6 
Republic of Korea 11.9 
Philippines 18.6 
China 6.0 
Vietnam 23.4 
Vietnam non-oil 16.3 
Source: General Statistical Office (GSO) and Asia Pacific Quarterly Update 
(Adopted from World Bank 2000, op cit.). 
 
Between 1997and 1999, exports by private sector grew very fast and much faster 
than those of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). As Table 8 indicates that over the two 
years 98-99 exports by small and medium domestic private enterprises grew by 72.5 
percent, while exports of SOEs rose by 4.6 percent only. Thus despite its small size, the 
private domestic sector accounted for 39.1 percent of the periods non-oil export growth. 
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Table 8: Non-oil Export Growth by Sectors 
 
 1997 
(US$ 
million) 
1999 
(US$ 
million) 
2-year 
Export 
Growth (%) 
Distribution 
of Export 
Growth (%) 
State-owned enterprises 5,207 5,260 4.6 13.7 
Foreign-invested enterprises 1,790 2,590 44.7 47.2 
     In which: EPZs 292 581 98.8 17.0 
Private enterprises 915 1,578 72.5 39.1 
Total 7,732 9,428 21.9 100 
 Source: General Department of Customs and Ministry of Trade 
 
The general trend of imports and exports of Vietnam is presented in Chart 3. 
Chart 3: Trend of Vietnam’s Imports and Exports 1990-2000 
 Source: General Statistic Office 
Based on the trade performance of Vietnam in recent years, the World Bank 
(World Bank 2000) suggested the following findings: 
§ Exceptional export growth of 23.4 percent in 1999, especially non-oil exports 
(growing a 16.3 percent), suggests that Vietnam is very competitive in world markets. 
Vietnam’s export growth exceeded those of other countries in the region. 
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§ Reforms expanding trading rights and access of private SMEs have paid off as non-
oil exports by these firms grew by 72.5 percent over two years, accounting for 
39.1percent of the growth in non-oil exports. 
§ If reforms to liberalize the private sector continue and if normal access to all world 
markets is enhanced, private domestic SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises) and 
foreign investors are likely to undertake the investment required to sustain Vietnam 
rapid export growth. 
3.4. Vietnam’s Current Integration Program and Its Relevance to the WTO 
Principles  
 
3.4.1. Current Multilateral and Bilateral Arrangements 
Vietnam signed a preferential trade agreement with the European Economic 
Community (now the EU) in 1992. This involved the granting of quotas to export textiles 
and clothing to Europe and the granting of a 2-percentage point preference on imports of 
selected goods from the EU.  
When Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995 it also became a member of the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (AFTA). This involved entering into commitments to reduce tariffs on 
imports from ASEAN to 0–5 per cent over a ten-year period on a wide range of industrial 
and agricultural commodities under the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme 
(CEPT). It also involved making commitments to eliminate nontariff barriers on goods 
covered by the CEPT and to harmonize cus toms, investment and standards regulations 
and procedures. 
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Vietnam’s Specific Commitments under CEPT are as follows (IMF, 2000): 
a) Inclusion List (IL): This list covers items on which tariffs are to be reduced to the 
common effective preferential tariff (CEPT) of 0-5 percent by 2006. It effectively 
comprises all items not on the exclusion list below and will comprise about 6,030 
items by 2003. The IL currently comprises 4,233 items, of which tariffs on 1,270 
items are over 5 percent and 451 items are over 20 percent, with tariffs on a few 
items as high as 50 percent. Although a linear tariff reduction over the phase- in 
period is recommended, the annual tariff rate reduction must be at least 5 percent. 
Under the implementing arrangements, by 2003 very few IL items would have 
CEPT rates over 20 percent. 
b) Temporary Exclusion List (TEL):  This list covers items to be phased into the IL 
by 2003. In early 2000, in accordance with the existing plan, 640 items were 
moved from the TEL to the IL, to bring the IL up to 4,233 items. After the 2000 
installment, the TEL now comprises about 1,800 items, which will be transferred 
to the IL in three roughly equal annual installments, so that by 2003 the TEL will 
be depleted. 
c) General Exclusion List (GEL): This list covers items not subject to liberalization 
for cultural, security, health, and environmental reasons. This list comprises 202 
items, including alcoholic beverages, automobiles, motorcycles and kits, and 
petroleum products, which are currently subject to quantitative restrictions. 
However, the scope of the GEL is being reviewed, and a few items, including 
radios and larger motorcycles are likely to be removed. 
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d) Sensitive Exclusion List (SEL): In accordance with the Protocol on Sensitive and 
Highly Sensitive Products signed on September 3, 1999, Vietnam has 51 items, 
mainly unprocessed agricultural products and including sugar, on the sensitive list 
and no products on the highly sensitive list. Items on the SEL are to have tariffs 
reduced to 0-5 percent by 2013, and by at least 10 percent each year starting no 
later than 2006, but sugar is specially to reach the 0-5 percent target by 2010. All 
quantitative restrictions and other nontariff barriers are to be removed from these 
items by 2013. 
Vietnam’s tariff schedule under AFTA CEPT for 1999-2000 is presented in Table 9. 
 
Table 9: Vietnam' CEPT Tariff Rates, 1999-2000 
Rates in 1999  Rates in 2000 
Bands Number of lines  Bands Number of lines 
 Number Percent   Number Percent 
0 1,523 42.7  0 1,690 39.9 
1 82 2.3  1 155 3.7 
3 332 9.3  3 335 7.9 
4 1 0.0  4 0 0.0 
5 561 15.7  5 783 18.5 
7 20 0.6  7 10 0.2 
10 261 7.3  10 573 13.5 
15 470 13.2  15 129 3.0 
20 25 0.7  20 107 2.5 
25 24 0.7  25 13 0.3 
30 33 0.9  30 72 1.7 
35 3 0.1  35 280 6.6 
40 231 6.5  40 82 1.9 
45 1 0.0  45 1 0.0 
    50 3 0.1 
Total 3,567 100  Total 4,233 100 
       
Average 7.1  Average 7.3 
Standard deviation 10.6  Standard deviation 10.7 
Source: Tariff Schedule, Ministry of Finance 
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While the normal tariff schedule is as follows (Table 10): 
Table 10: Summary of Normal Tariff Schedule, 1999-20005 
 
Rates in 1999  Rates in 2000 
Bands Number of lines  Bands Number of lines 
 Number Percent   Number Percent 
0 1,965 32,4  0 2,029 32,0 
1 148 2.4  1 173 2.7 
3 374 6.2  3 381 6.0 
5 616 10.2  5 697 10.7 
10 448 7.4  7 7 0.1 
15 58 1.0  10 519 8.2 
20 531 8.8  12 2 0.0 
30 663 10.9  15 79 1.2 
40 617 10.2  18 1 0.0 
50 574 9.5  20 516 8.1 
60 34 0.6  25 3 0.0 
100 28 0.5  30 633 10.0 
    40 678 10.7 
    45 2 0.0 
    50 569 9.0 
    55 1 0.0 
    60 12 0.2 
    80 9 0.1 
    100 48 0.8 
Total 6,056 100  Total 6,341 100 
       
Number of bands 12  Number of bands 19 
Average 15.5  Average 15.4 
Standard deviation 17.7  Standard deviation 18.1 
 
Source: Tariff Schedule, Ministry of Finance 
 
In 1994 Vietnam was granted observer status at the GATT and in 1996 it 
submitted a memorandum on its foreign trade regime as part of its application to join the 
WTO. The status of Vietnam’s accession to the WTO is presented in Table 2 (Part II). 
                                               
5 The normal tariff rates are termed preferential in the official schedule. There are also non-preferential 
tariff rates about 50% higher than these rates, which are applied to imports from countries without a trade 
agreement (or not in the process of negotiating one). 
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The US – Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement 
The bilateral trade agreement signed in July 2000 with the United States (subject 
to approval of parliaments) would give Vietnam normal trade access to the US market in 
exchange for Vietnam phasing in steps to liberalize non-tariff barriers, customs 
procedures, investment measures, and entry requirements for some services, and for 
reducing some tariffs.  
The agreement is divided into six chapters: (1) market access for industrial goods 
and farm products; (2) intellectual property; (3) trade in services; (4) investment; (5) 
business facilitation; (6) transparency. In each case, it sets clear and specific 
commitments and timetables, which will go into effect after the agreement is 
implemented through a congressional decision of both countries (U.S. Dept. of State, 
2000). 
In November 1998, Vietnam became a full member of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) group, and submitted an Individual Action Plan (IAP) for meeting 
the liberalization objectives associated with membership. 
 
3.4.2. The Relevance of Vietnam’s Integration Program to the WTO 
While there are some important differences in detail, each of other multilateral and 
bilateral agreements embraces principles similar to those of the WTO (CIE, 1998 op cit.): 
· Transparency; 
· Reducing reliance on nontariff barriers; 
· Lowering barriers to trade; and 
· Non-discrimination and national treatment. 
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These principles would be important to apply in Vietnam, even if their 
implementation was not called for as part of international commitments. This is because 
of the critical role that trade and investment policies play in shaping the environment for 
investment and economic development. Applying them would be good for both Vietnam, 
and for its trade partners.  
Transparency 
Policy transparency helps investors, producers, workers and consumers to plan 
their behavior with some degree of certainty about the impact of government activities. 
Transparency in trade and investment policy may benefit Vietnam’s trading partners, but 
the big benefits are to the people of Vietnam. Improving transparency will require some 
important institutional and procedural developments, which may in turn involve changes 
in some overall approaches to administration of economic management. Some of these 
changes are discussed below. 
Reducing Barriers to Trade 
 
Despite the obvious benefits flowing from increased trade over the past 10 years 
the contribution of lower trade barriers to the welfare of the Vietnamese people 
questioned by some people. International trade is sometimes seen in Vietnam as more an 
aspect of international relations policies than it is about domestic economic development 
and resource allocation. The adjustments caused by reducing trade barriers are sometimes 
seen as a cost of pursuing international relations objectives. 
They can be, however, the main source of domestic benefit that should drive trade 
reform, with the impact on international relations being seen as a secondary benefit. 
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Reducing reliance on non-tariff barriers 
The case for reducing reliance on non-tariff barriers is often expressed in terms of 
transparency. However, the most compelling domestic reason for replacing non-tariff 
barriers by tariffs as an instrument for protection lies in the way in which NTBs provide 
protection. Of course, some of Vietnam’s NTBs are not directly targeted at industry 
protection objectives. Examples include restrictions used to maintain health and safety 
standards, or to meet quarantine objectives. For such barriers, acceding to WTO or 
meeting regional commitments may require using alternative forms of regulation, or 
adopting internationally recognized procedures for determining the nature and extent of 
barriers. 
When a tariff is used to protect local producers, there is a fixed percentage by 
which these producers can charge higher prices and sustain higher costs of production. 
This ensures that producers face incentives to avoid deterioration in their competitiveness. 
It also puts a cap on the costs that the community at large must bear to protect the 
industry. Non-tariff barriers, especially quantitative restrictions on imports, by contrast, 
impose no explicit limit on the level of protection and extent of costs imposed on the 
community. 
In Vietnam, some quantitative restrictions on imports, such as those used for 
commodities subject to policies aimed at maintaining balances between supply and 
demand, have a rather complex effect on local producers. Among the effects are: 
· Destabilization of domestic markets and prices; and 
· Creation of windfall profits which lead to the imposition of other forms of control. 
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Replacing these non-tariff barriers with moderate levels of tariff protection would 
appear in some cases to provide advantages to local producers as well as to consumers. 
More generally, reducing reliance on non-tariff barriers is one of the principles of WTO 
that would be unambiguously good for Vietnam, and Vietnam should develop a strategy 
for continuing the ongoing process of eliminating NTBs as a matter of urgency.  
 
Non-discrimination and National Treatment 
 
While the principle of non-discrimination seems to have its logic in achieving fair 
and equal treatment across trading and investing partners, the more compelling reason for 
its application lies in its domestic benefits. 
Application of the principle means that Vietnam would always have access to the 
best sources of imports and foreign investment. Discrimination may well involve skewing 
incentives so that traders purchase imports with higher foreign exchange costs to the 
nation because the best value source is subject to a higher tariff. This is why Vietnam 
should seriously consider applying AFTA CEPT concessions on a global basis, rather 
than limiting them to imports from AFTA countries. 
National treatment involves providing country goods and investors the same 
treatment as their local counterparts. As far as goods are concerned, it is a logical 
counterpart of non-discrimination, and largely consistent with current practice in Vietnam. 
Providing national treatment under the General Agreement on Trade in Services and the 
Agreement on Trade Related Investment measures will involve more changes from 
current practice. It is broadly consistent with much of present thinking, where there is 
movement towards creating a unified legal framework for all enterprises regardless of 
ownership. But there may be a need to accelerate development of other elements of the 
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legal and institutional framework (contract law, financial regulations, for example) to 
clear the way for further movement on this front. 
 
3.5. Challenges/Problems and Strategic Considerations 
Many of the changes that are being contemplated as Vietnam pursues accession to 
WTO and meeting its commitments under AFTA are no different from what an 
appropriate economic development and trade strategy might involve. 
However, some people in Vietnam are concerned about the impact of open trade 
on Vietnam’s existing industries. This view may be summarized as follows: 
· Vietnam’s older technology means that Vietnamese firms cannot compete in an 
open trade environment; and  
 
· Trade barriers should maintained, at least until the economy becomes modernized. 
But modernization will not happen if the economy remains closed. And if the 
economy is opened up on a selective basis with a view to protecting the least competitive 
—  least modern — sectors then, paradoxically, those areas, which need to modernize the 
most, will be the ones where the least happens. 
While many people in Vietnam see an open trade regime as a desirable policy 
objective, some of them are concerned that the institutional arrangements for efficient 
market allocation are not yet established. On the basis of these concerns it is suggested 
that trade barriers be reduced slowly and that there be some centralized direction of 
resources. 
As other economies in transition pursuing integration activities under the WTO 
Vietnam also has problems with institutional arrangements to support a market 
economy. As a centrally planed economy, for many years these institutions were not 
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encouraged to grow. And many existing institutions, including the continued reliance on 
SOEs and the relationship of these enterprises with government line departments, are all 
likely to inhibit market responses. This raises three questions from a strategy viewpoint. 
First, how much of an integration strategy should be about building institutional 
arrangements for a market economy? Second, pending the development of these 
arrangements should the government go slow on removing trade barriers? And third, 
what should the government do in the interim as institutions are evolving? 
On the first question —  how much should an integration strategy be about 
institutional development —  the answer is simple: a lot. While many of the lessons from 
the experience of other countries are open to various interpretations, this one is not —  
there is general agreement that institution matter. Although Vietnam is starting from 
behind due to its centrally planned past, the emphasis is already well recognized in 
Vietnam.  
On the second question —  should the lack of market oriented institutional 
arrangements be a basis for slowing down the program of trade reform associated with 
membership of regional and multilateral agreements —  we see no basis for trying to 
dilute or escape these commitments. To the contrary, there are good reasons not to tie the 
pace of trade reforms to the negotiation process of WTO accession. Meeting WTO 
accession procedure would help Vietnam to accelerate institutional reform. 
First, the government has already done much to establish market-oriented 
institutions. The speed at which these arrangements have become consolidated is partly 
driven by demand. If firms, including state owned firms, are to be required to operate in 
an administered, centrally directed framework they are less likely to see a need for 
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market based institutions —  private property, rules of contract, banking systems, 
financial markets and the like. However, if they operate in international markets where 
everyone they meet has access to these things they are likely to want them to be 
established at home. A perfect harmony between openness and institutional arrangements 
is never likely to exist. Even in the most developed economies, institutional arrange ments 
for, say, communications, banking and employment is constantly changing as 
communication, transport and international capital markets are changing. The lack of 
perfect institutional arrangements in these countries is a trigger to building better ones 
and not a basis for raising artificial barriers to the rest of the world. 
A second reason for sticking to existing commitments is that the problem with 
many of the existing arrangements is that market correction of mistakes will be slow to 
occur. This is particularly important given the government’s commitment to the continual 
existence of a large state owned sector. Openness creates a powerful source of 
information for international markets, central planners and SOEs. 
A third is the benefit of credibility and predictability. Programs such as the CEPT 
program under AFTA and tariff bindings under the WTO will provide a basis for people 
to plan their investments.  
The Problem of NTBs (Non-tariff Barriers) 
The feature of Vietnam’s current trade policies lying at the heart of the main costs 
being born is the regime of administrative controls on trade, especially NTBs to imports.  
Despite the fact that great efforts have been made in reduction of NTBs, various 
kinds of NTBs are still used in Vietnam to pursue a wide range of objectives. Some 
reflect a continued concern to ‘manage’ or to ‘balance’ demand and supply for goods that 
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considered being of strategic importance for the economy. Others are designed to 
conserve the use of foreign exchange or to deter imports of goods considered to be of low 
priority, or to protect local producers. Some, for goods under specialized line 
management, are used to achieve a range of regulatory objectives.  
Effective April 1, 2000, quantitative restrictions (QRs) were removed from 8 of 
the 19 items subject to QRs. The items liberalized were liquid soda, raw material for 
plastics, fertilizer, ceramic and glass consumer goods, bicycles, ceramic sanitary wares, 
consumer electric fans, and plastic packaging. Tariffs on these items were increased to 
100 percent for some glass consumer products and 80 percent for bicycles, but the rate on 
fertilizer was only raised to 5 percent. 
More generally, there appears to be much greater easing of import regime than 
implied by the removal of QRs. In the first half of 2000, imports rose by an estimated 34 
percent (over the same period in 1999), after three years of no increase in the value of 
total imports (despite large increase in oil prices, high export growth in 1999, and real 
GDP growth of 5 percent during these three years). 
The goods remaining subject to QRs are ceramic and granite tiles, vegetable oil, 
window glass, paper newsprint writing, and packaging), construction steel, cement and 
clinker, motor cars for16 or fewer passengers, motorcycles and kits, sugar, alcoholic 
beverages, and petroleum products. The last two items were removed from the list of 
items subject to import licensing (Decision 242/1999/QD-TTg), but are under separate 
controlling instruments that still restrict the total value of permitted imports. 
In early 1999, a new and substantially revised the tariff schedule was introduced. 
It reduced the maximum standard tariff rate to 50 percent; about 1 percent of line items 
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had rates above this level, mainly alcoholic beverages and motor vehicles. This new 
schedule was also more in line with the harmonized standard nomenclature, increasing 
the total number of tariff items to about 6,000. 
In early 2000, the tariff schedule was again revised, partly to reflect the tariff 
increases needed for newly liberalized imports. These changes contributed to the increase 
in the number of tariff rates to 19 from 12 in 1999. Notwithstanding the increase in tariff 
rates on the liberalized items, the average tariff rate from the schedule remained at 15.5 
percent, since the number of items with rates of 20 percent or less increased slightly.  
 
Chart 4: Import Coverage of QRs 
  Source: General Statistic Office (GSO), 2000 
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Chart 5. Production Coverage of QRs 
 
Source: General Statistic Office (GSO), 2000 
Chart 4 shows that approximately 40 percent of imports are subject to 
administrative restrictions. Chart 5 shows the coverage of QRs under Degree 57 and 
Decision 254, in terms of goods production levels. Around 24 percent of production of 
goods is subject to protection from QRs. In terms of total production (goods and services) 
coverage is about 15 percent. Some 3 percent of the work force I in sectors where QRs 
are in effect.  
CIE’s study of NTBs (CIE 1999) presents information on the potential impact of 
QRs on cost of production in the economy. Table 11 shows some indications of the costs 
incurred in different sectors of the economy because of the current QRs on imports. 
Table 11: Estimated cost savings from removal of QRs and associated protection 
Industry Cost savings 
 % 
Agriculture 3.1 
Construction 3.8 
Food processing 6.4 
Printing and publishing 2.2 
Source: CIE (1999) 
Production with 
no QRs 
76%
Production 
subject QRs
24%
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For many of the industries, whose outputs are covered by QRs, it is not the case 
that all producers need the blanket protection accorded by the restriction. Case studies of 
cement, steel and plastics presented in the report on NTBs (CIE 1999) show that 
technology, costs and competitiveness vary considerably across enterprises in these 
enterprises. They also show that the price differentials (between international and 
domestic prices) supported by these barriers are volatile and often quite small. Many 
industries protected by QRs are subject to constraints on pricing, market exploitation and 
investment that offset or blunt the incentives for expansion created by the protection. But 
at the same time these constraints raise production costs and give rise to inefficiencies. A 
policy approach that removed these constraints and the protection might see many 
enterprises in these industries to compete better. 
NTBs are generally undesirable instruments to meet trade policy objectives 
because of the following reasons: 
§ The use of NTBs disconnects an important signal to resource allocation – the price in 
international markets – which provides signals to investors, producers and consumers 
about Vietnam’s comparative advantage and the opportunity costs of producing (or 
not producing) goods locally; 
§ Absence of transparency – because trade is subject to administrative controls, 
whether or not the import of a particular good is allowed is settled in a process that is 
both obscure and unpredictable. This increases the risks associated with trading and 
production decisions, and makes them vulnerable to lobbying and strategic 
manipulation by traders and producers; 
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§ Managing trade to achieve ‘balances’ within the economy – an explicit objective for 
key NTBs – is becoming close to impossible as the economy becomes more diverse 
and complicated; 
§ The level of protection accorded by NTBs is not fixed, and rises to accommodate 
deteriorating competitiveness of local producers. Incentives to become efficient are 
thus muted at best; 
§ The cost born by other sectors on the economy also varies according to the 
competitiveness of local producers, increasing their uncertainty;  
§ Current NTBs, which are often very selective within classes of product, can promote 
wasteful importation as users substitute less appropriate alternatives for the imports 
under control; 
§ Allocation of rights to import goods subject to NTB confers access to economic rents 
– these rents are often dissipated and allocation methods do not ensure that the most 
efficient importers get access to rights; and 
§ NTBs are often complex to administer, adding to the burdens on customs and traders. 
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PART IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMEDATIONS 
 
Since doi moi, many changes have been done in the field of trade liberalization 
that have contributed to high growth rate and trade performance in Vietnam. However, to 
complete the remaining stages of accession Vietnam should: 
· Incorporate the guiding principles of WTO into domestic policy formulation as 
quickly as possible; 
· Formulae and adopt a strategy for tariff based protection, involving a program for 
phasing out NTBs and moving towards a lower and more uniform and more stable 
tariff structure; 
- For some NTBs, the key is to develop appropriate, non-discriminatory forms 
of regulation to achieve non-protective objectives 
- For other, the issue is to switch to tariff based protection as soon as possible to 
send clear signals to producers and investors that the level of protection is 
bounded; 
· Let markets determine the exchange rate; 
· Adopt an appropriate policy and institutional regime to promote domestic competition 
- placing priority on review and reform of regulation, laws and administrative 
practices that impede competition; and  
· Moving towards a unified legal, regulatory and taxation treatment of domestic and 
foreign investment. 
The process of accession to WTO poses a number of challenges for transition 
economies like Vietnam, primarily with respect to how liberal a trade and investment 
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regime to commit to in the negotiation process. The key areas where these decisions need 
to be made relate to the level at which to bind tariffs, the support to be provided to 
agriculture and the range of commitments in the area of trade in services. 
There is a tendency for some countries to approach these issues with a strategy 
aimed at the committing to the least liberalization possible to ensure accession. The 
negotiation/concession framework of the accession process —  and the general WTO 
approach to liberalization — are inclined to foster such an approach, since it is seen to 
provide countries with ‘bargaining chips’. However this is a very dangerous, and rather 
perverse approach. As one commentator has pointed out (Michalopoulos, op cit): 
Individual countries, especially small transition economies, have little leverage in 
market access negotiations: hence the potential benefits they may be able to obtain from 
such a strategy may be very small. At the same time, maintaining protection through 
relatively high tariffs and protected agriculture and service sectors, simply means that 
they impose costs to their own economies, by foregoing the benefits of a more liberal 
trade regime, which in the first instance accrue to the country itself. If, on the other had, 
countries bind tariffs at levels higher than those applied and assume few commitments 
regarding agriculture and services, both of which are possible under WTO rules, they are 
subject to another risk: they create the opening for domestic interests to exert political 
pressure for additional protection in the future. 
The experience of some Former Soviet Union countries has been that placing 
limited offers on the table during accession negotiations serves mainly to delay the 
process —  accession Working Parties have been known to simply ask the country to 
submit a revised offer before serious negotiations occur (Michalopoulos, op cit). 
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This leads to a broader question of the implications for Vietnam of entering into 
bind ing international commitments that constrain the government’s scope for imposing 
restrictions on international trade and investment. At one level, this could be seen as 
accepting external limitations on domestic policy making. Membership of WTO may 
involve adhering to certain codes of conduct with respect to government procurement, 
operation of state trading enterprises, quarantine controls, agricultural subsidies, as well 
as application of non-tariff barriers to imports and short-term protection. And the 
forthcoming round of WTO negotiations may lead to further agreements. 
In order to address the requirements of joining WTO, attention will need to be 
given to a wide range of policy and institutional issues. 
Much of the country’s reform efforts under doi moi have been targeted at 
establishing the legal and institutional underpinnings of a market economy. Implementing 
a number of the WTO agreements will involve taking these reforms further. This is not 
only because agreements (such as TRIPS and TRIMS) require specific changes in 
legislation. Equally importantly, for the domestic economy to take best advantage of the 
opportunities created by integration, certain reforms will need to be pursued with urgency. 
Some obvious examples are: 
§ Improving the framework for governance of SOEs; 
§ Restructuring the banking system, and developing more appropriate systems of 
supervision and regulation; 
§ Extending and integrating the system of enterprise legislation  
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§ Strengthening legal and institutional mechanisms affecting contracting, especially 
credit contracts (secured transactions, bankruptcy, dispute resolution procedures 
etc) 
§ Making administrative structures more responsive to the emerging systems of 
economic management and regulation in a market economy. 
One of the key considerations in addressing some of the WTO agenda, particularly 
the newer agreements such as TRIMS, TRIPS and GATS, is the speed with which 
Vietnam can improve the environment for domestic investors and corporations. 
Acceptance of the integration agenda is dependent on the extent to which all sectors in 
the community can benefit from the associated changes in policies. If the domestic 
business sector remains constrained by unnecessary regulation, a poorly functioning 
financial sector, uncertainty with regard to property rights, there may be strong resistance 
to change. More importantly the overall benefits of integration may be slower in coming 
if these other improvements are not made.  
 As discussed in Part II, the basic reason for the slow process of accepting new 
members in the WTO is that potential members are subject to far more comprehensive 
obligations than before. It is not just the direct and indirect ramifications of trade policies 
affecting manufactured imports as, with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, services, 
agriculture and other areas are included in the WTO system. Further more, since special 
exemptions for developing countries have been either reduced or eliminated, new 
members must fulfill stricter conditions. Likewise, in the case of the most important 
candidates major members are attempting to extract even better liberalization and market 
agreements (ESCAP, UNCTAD and ADB, 1999).  
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In this context, Vietnam should does its best to accelerate trade liberalization to be 
eligible for WTO membership while make use of exemptions for a developing country6 
where possible. 
More specifically, based on the WTO principles/agreements we would like to 
recommend the following actions for Vietnam’s accession to the WTO (Table 12). 
Table 12: Summary of WTO Principles/Agreements and Recommended Actions for 
Vietnam’s Accession 
 
Item Content  Recommended Actions  
General principles   
MFN Accord all members the most 
favorable  treatment accorded 
any trading partners 
Review of bilateral trade agreements 
to ensure MFN consistency 
National 
treatment  
Treat domestic and foreign 
products, services and 
nationals the same 
Move to unified legislation, 
regulatory framework for foreign 
and domestic enterprises operating 
in Vietnam 
Limiting use of 
non-tariff  
trade 
instruments 
Limited use of quotas, 
technical barriers to trade for 
protection except in special 
circumstances 
- Phase out of QRs on import 
- Reform specialized management of 
imports of certain commodities 
 
Reducing and 
binding import 
tariffs 
Commit not to increase tariffs 
and to participate in future 
negotiations to tariffs 
- Formulate strategy on tariff 
binding for access negotiation 
- Develop long-term tariff structure 
Customs 
Valuation 
Adopt GATT customs 
valuation agreement, placing 
invoice value as primary base 
for value for duty 
Phase out minimum price list, train 
customs in valuation procedures 
Agreement on 
Technical 
Barriers to 
Trade  
Refrain from using technical 
requirements o create barriers 
to trade and provide protection 
Reform of specialized line management 
of imports. Upgrading of systems, 
procedures associated with design, 
recognition and enforcement of 
technical standards 
                                               
6  Because this mainly depends on negotiations, the country’s capacity building and assistance from 
international recourses are needed. 
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Table12: (Continued) 
 
Agreement on 
Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary 
Measures 
Quarantine measures should be 
transparent and based purely 
on scientific considerations. 
Information bureaus required 
to meet needs of interested 
parties 
Review and upgrading of quarantine 
system and capabilities 
Agreement on 
import 
licensing 
procedures 
Ensure licensing procedures 
and transparent, predictable, 
fair and do not create extra 
constrains on trade 
Review and shorten list of goods 
under specialization management. 
Make basis of restriction on 
importation of selected goods 
explicit. Reform procedures for 
enforcing standards to replace 
licensing system. 
Agreement on 
Subsidies and 
Countervailing 
Measures 
- Discouraging and 
constraining use of subsidies 
which may impact and distort 
trade.  
- Allowing members to impose 
measures to countervail effects 
of subsidies.  
- Determining principles for 
imposing antidumping duties 
- Modification certain export 
promotion measures and regional 
investment promotion. 
- Review subsidies provided to state 
enterprises (confessional credit, debt 
write offs and debt rescheduling). 
Agreement on 
Trade Related 
Investment 
Measures 
(TRIMS) 
Prohibits using measures 
inconsistent with national 
treatment and rules against use 
of QRs, including local content 
and trade balancing 
requirements, restrictions 
access to foreign exchange for 
imports 
- Significant changes in foreign 
investment legal framework 
- Further development of market 
based management of foreign 
exchange 
General 
agreement on 
Trade in 
Services 
(GATS) 
Application of general 
principles of national and 
MFN treatment, mutual 
recognition, qualifications for 
supply of services, 
transparency of procedures. 
Also involves specific market 
access commitments 
- Changes to mechanisms for 
formulating and implementing laws 
and regulations impacting on 
services to meet transparency 
principle. 
- Detailed analysis to develop 
strategy for market access 
commitments, to develop 
appropriate regulatory regimes 
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Table12: (Continued) 
 
Agreement on 
Government 
Procurement 
Application of MFN and 
national treatment principles to 
procurement by government 
bodies7. 
Development of laws and regulation 
on bidding 
Provisions on 
state trading 
enterprises 
Ensure arms length transitions 
with state trading enterprises 
and limitation of privileges 
accorded such enterprises. 
Elimination of de jury and de facto 
state enterprise monopolies in trade. 
Agreement on 
Trade-related 
Aspect of 
Intellectual 
Property 
Rights 
(TRIPS)8 
Set minimum compulsory 
standards for intellectual 
property production  
Amendments to provisions of 
current legal basis for IPR 
protection. Strengthen mechanisms 
for enforcement of IPRs. 
 
                                               
7 Membership of WTO does not require accession to the requirement. But transition economies pressured 
to join the agreement in WTO accession process. 
8 For the details of this issue see WTO (c) - WT/ACC/9: Implementation of the WTO Agreement on Trade-
related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Note by the Secretariat, 15 November 1999. 
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